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LIABILITY FOR UNPAID FREIGHT CHARGES
LIABILITY OF CONSIGNORS AND CONSIGNEES OF
INTERSTATE SHIPMENTS FOR UNPAID
FREIGHT CHARGES
By EDGAR WATKINS*
A DECIDED weight of authority would allow the carrier to
recover from the consignor any unpaid freight charges re-
maining due after goods have been delivered, and no charge, or a
charge less than that called for by the lawful tariffs, has been col-
lected.' In the courts which follow this general rule, it is imma-
terial whether the unpaid charges result from a partial prepayment
by the consignor or the collection of less than the amount required
by the tariffs from the consignee. Several courts refuse to allow
the consignor to be held liable unless an effort has been made to
collect unpaid charges from the consignee.2 The theory underlying
such initial and permanent liability on the part of the consignor
is well expressed in a recent decision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in which it is said:'
"The consignor, being the one with whom contract of transpor-
tation is made, is originally liable for the carrier charges, and un-
less it is specifically exempted by the provisions of the bill of lad-
ing, or unless the goods are received or transported under such
circumstances as would clearly indicate an exemption for him, the
carrier is entitled to look to the consignor for charges."
Having concluded that the consignor is liable in every case for
the unpaid freight charges unless specially exempted, the next
question to be considered is whether or not and under what cir-
cumstances the consignee is liable for any or all unpaid freight
charges on interstate shipments. First of all, it will be necessary
to consider certain provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act,
bearing in mind that the purpose of this act, as frequently de-
clared in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, was
to provide one rate for all shipments of like character and to make
*Of the Atlanta Bar.
'Baltimore, etc., Ry. v. New Albany Box and Basket Co., (1911) 48
Ind. App. 647, 94 N. E. 906; Georgia R. R. v. Creety (1909) 5 Ga. App.
424, 63 S. E. 528; 2 Michie, Carriers sec. 1547, note 3.
2Yazoo etc., R. Co. v. Zemurray, (1917) 238 Fed. 789; King v. Van
Slack, (1916) 193 Mich. 105, 159 N. W. 157.
3In the Matter of Bills of Lading, (1919) 52 I. C. C. 671, 721.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the rate charged for the transportation of goods in interstate com-
merce the rate duly filed with the commission. In this way dis-
crimination is avoided and all shipments receive like treatment
which it is the main purpose of the act to secure.
Turning our attention to the act itself, we find that section 6
which is now and has been in operation with modifications since
1887 provides:
"Nor shall the carrier charge, or demand, or collect, or re-
ceive a greater or less or different compensation for such trans-
portation of passengers or property or for any service in con-
nection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs, than
the rates, fares and charges mentioned or specified in the tariff
filed and in effect at the-time; nor shall any carrier refund or re-
mit in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates, fares
and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any
privilege or facilities in the transportation of passengers or
property except as are specified in such tariffs."'4
This section is mandatory upon the carrier requiring it to
collect the charges called for in the published tariffs but does not
name the party or parties from whom the charges are due or
collectible, that is, the consignor or consignee, thus creating no
new liability and imposing no additional burden upon them apart
from their common law liability.
In the Transportation Act 1920 a new provision added to sec-
tion 3 of the previous act reads :'
"From and after July 1, 1920, no carrier by railroad subject to
the provisions of this act shall deliver or relinquish possession at
destination of the freight transported by it until all tariff rates
and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and
regulations as the commission may from time to time prescribe to
assure prompt payment of all such rates and charges and to pre-
vent unjust discrimination. .. "
While this new section does not enlarge the legal liability of
the parties -who would ordinarily be liable 'for the unpaid freight
charges but simply places an affirmative duty on the carrier,
nevertheless in its actual operation it does result in the consignee
being compelled either to pay the charges due before receiving the
goods or to execute a bond or establish credit relations with the
carrier sufficiently ample to guarantee payment of freight charges
on his entire business, both of which arrangements must be made
under the terms and conditions imposed by the Interstate Com-
431 Stat. at L. 587, Chap. 3591; Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 8597.5Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 3, par. 2.
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merce Commission. This section goes a long way toward elimi-
nating the issue as to whether or not the consignor or consignee
shall pay the freight charges, since most consignees either pay the
freight or obligate themselves so to do before they receive the
goods. The position of the occasional shipper or consignee who
has no credit relations with the carrier and who receives the
freight, paying the charges demanded at the time of delivery, is,
of course, the same as it was before this amendment. While the
section does not specifically enlarge the obligation of the con-
signee, it would seem, when considering the effects of its operation,
that the Congress must have thought the consignee liable for un-
paid freight charges, and so thinking have provided a practical
arrangement whereby when goods are erroneously delivered by
the carrier to the consignee before the latter has paid all the
freight charges which the carrier at the time thinks are due, the
carrier can in most cases unquestionably hold the consignee liable
for the balance of the proper charge.
Although the Interstate Commerce Commission realizes that
someone must pay the lawful tariff charges, it has in a conference
ruling7 clearly explained that it will not attempt to determine in
any case whether the consignee or consignor is legally liable for
undercharges, asserting that such a question can only be de-
termined by a court having jurisdiction and upon all the facts in
each case. Hence it is to decisions of the various courts inter-
preting the applicable statutes, above quoted, in connection with
the common law that we must turn to find out under what, if any,
circumstances the consignee is liable for unpaid freight charges.
The scope and meaning of section 6 above quoted was consid-
ered by the United States Supreme Court in a decision which gives
light upon the subject under discussion, the question at issue being
whether the plaintiff could recover under the statute of the state
of Texas imposing a penalty upon the carrier for failure to deliver
goods on tender of the rate named in the bill of lading when such
rate was not the lawful tariff rate, or whether the state statute
must yield to section 6 which prescribes that the published tariff
rates are the lawful charges. It was held that the published
tariffs governed and that the plaintiff could not recover.8
OEx Parte 73, (1920) 57 I. C. C. 591.
7Conference Ruling 314.
SThe Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hefley & Lewis, (1895) 158 U. S. 98, 39 L.
Ed. 910, 15 S. C. R. 802.
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In a similar case in Alabama, the plaintiff failed to recover, the
court relying upon the decision above quoted and saying: 9
"The clear effect of the decision was to declare that one who
has obtained from a common carrier transportation of goods from
one state to another at a rate specified in the bill of lading less
than the published schedule rate filed with and approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and in force at the time,
whether or not he knew that the rate obtained was less than the
schedule rate, is not entitled to recover the goods or damages for
their detention upon a tender of payment of the amount of
charges named in the bill of lading or of any sum less than the
schedule charges; in other words, that whatever may be the rate
agreed upon, the carrier's lien on the goods is by force of the
act of Congress for the amount fixed by the published schedule of
rates and charges and this lien can be discharged by the payment
or tender of payment of such amount. Such is now the supreme
law and by it this and the courts of all other states are bound."
Whatever doubt may have previously existed in the minds of
counsel as to the effect of section 6 upon the subject of our dis-
cussion, the question of the liability of the consignee for unpaid
freight charges was definitely decided in a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, the facts of which were that goods were
shipped from Los Angeles, California, consigned to defendant at
Dayton, Ohio, $15.00 being paid by defendant upon receipt of the
goods, while under the tariffs on file the proper charges were
$30.00; defendant had no knowledge of the tariff rates and had
made no agreement with the consignor to pay the freight. This
suit was to collect the undercharge of $15.00. In holding defen-
dant liable for such charges the court said :10
"Examination shows some conflict of authority as to the
liability at common law of the consignee to pay freight charges
under the circumstances here shown. The weight of authority
seems to be that the consignee is prima facie liable for the pay-
ment of the freight charges when he accepts the goods from the
carrier. However this may be, in our view the question must be
decided upon consideration of the applicable provisions of the
statutes of the United States regulating interstate commerce."
And in discussing the effect of section 6 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the court said:
"It was therefore unlawful for the carrier, upon delivering
merchandise consigned to Fink, to depart from the tariff rates
filed. The statute made it unlawful for the carrier to receive
9Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, (1906) 202 U. S. 242, 50 L.
Ed. 1013, 26 S. C. R. 628.
loPittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fink, (1919) 250 U. S. 577, 580, 63 L. Ed.
1151, 40 S. C. R. 27.
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compensation less than the sum fixed by the tariff rates duly filed.
Fink, as well as the carrier, must be presumed to know the law
and to have understood that the rate charged could lawfully be
one when fixed by the tariff. When the carrier turned over the
goods to Fink upon a mistaken understanding of the rate legally
chargeable, both it and the consignee undoubtedly acted upon the
belief that the charges collected were those authorized by law.
Under such circumstances, consistently with the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, the consignee was only entitled to the
merchandise when he paid for the transportation thereof the
amount specified as required by the statute. For the legal charges
the carrier had a lien upon the goods and this lien could be dis-
charged and the consignee become entitled to the goods only upon
tender of payment of this rate. Texas & Pacific Co. v. Mugg,
202 U. S. 242. The transaction, in the light of the act, amounted
to an assumption on the part of Fink to pay the only legal rate
the carrier had the right to charge or the consignee the right to
pay.$)
In some cases where the consignee has based his selling price
upon the cost of the goods to him, including freight charges, and
the carrier later presents its bill for undercharges on the ship-
ment, considerable hardship is apt to result to the consignee.
This point was considered by the Supreme Court in the above de-
cision and at page 582 of the opinion it is said:
"This may be in the present as well as some other cases a
hardship upon the consignee due to the fact that he paid all that
was demanded when the freight was delivered, but instances of
individual hardship cannot change the policy which Congress
has embodied in the statute in order to secure uniformity in
charges for transportation. Louisville & NaMhville R. R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94. In that case the rule herein stated was
enforced as against a passenger who had purchased a ticket from
an agent of the company at less than the published rate. The
opinion in that case reviewed the previous decisions of this court
from which we find no occasion to depart."
While no remedy exists to mitigate the hardships which ac-
company the collection of undercharges made after the consignee
has sold the goods, basing his price upon the supposition that the
freight charges already collected were the full charges, the occur-
rence of such hardships may in a measure be prevented if the
shipper makes a written request upon the carrier for a written
statement of the rate or charge applicable to a described shipment,
such as is authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act,'- because
the act prescribes a penalty of $250.00 should the carrier refuse to
"Interstate Commerce Act, sec. 6, par. 11.
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furnish the rate or misstate the rate to the shipper's damage.
While this penalty accrues in favor of the United States and can
only be collected by it, still, it is believed that the carriers will
exercise more care in correctly quoting rates and charges for
which a written request is made if an error in so doing may in
each instance subject them to the penalty described. At any rate,
since this is the only protection available to the shipper, he has
all to gain and nothing to lose by making use of it.
In several earlier cases the principle of estoppel has been
brought into play to prevent the carrier from recovering under-
charges from the consignee after the delivery of the goods and
collection of what at that time the carrier mistakenly supposed to
be the lawful tariff charges. 2 The later and better reasoned
cases refuse to admit that the principle of estoppel is applicable in
such matters. In a recent New York case 3 the court said:
"The defendant therefore became bound to pay to the
plaintiff the charges-not those charges as erroneously or illegally
computed by the plaintiff or himself, but the lawful and correct
charges. If the amount of them were suliject to the determina-
tion of the plaintiff it might, of course, remit them in part or
perhaps estop itself from collecting the balance. We have no con-
cern here in regard to such hypothesis. The one and only lawful and
correct freight rate was that set forth in the schedule or tariff
file in the office of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
duly published and posted. The United States statutes known as
the Interstate Commerce Act made that rate arbitrary, immutable
by agreement, mistake or artifice of the parties, and not to be de-
viated from. The consignee, consignor and carrier were alike
charged with full knowledge of it and its inescapable force, and
it was the rate which defendant agreed to pay in accepting the
goods.
"The record does not present the question of estoppel on the
part of the plaintiff which could not by its act, intentionally or
unintentionally, release the defendant or itself from the compul-
sory direction of the statutes."
To the same effect is a recent Massachusetts case in which the
court said :14
"Estoppel against the collection of a rate fixed by rigid law
cannot be predicated upon a statement or representation which at
most can be of no higher binding force than an express contract
to the same effect honestly made by both parties would be. Such
22Central Railroad of New Jersey v. MacCartney, (1902) 68 N. J. Law
165, 52 At. 575; Hutchinson, Carriers, 3rd Ed. sec. 807.
'3Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Titus, (1915) 216 N. Y. 17, 109 N. E. 857.
14New York, etc., R. Co. v. York & Whitney, (1913) 215 Mass. 36, 40,
102 N. E. 366.
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a contract would be of no avail in any aspect because contrary
to law. Estoppel cannot rest on an illegal contract. . . . The
rate when published became established by law. It can be varied
only by law and not by act of the parties. The regulation by
Congress of interstate commerce rates takes the subject out of
the realm of ordinary contracts in some respects and places it upon
the rigidity of a quasi statutory enactment. The public policy
thus declared supersedes the ordinary doctrine of estoppel so far
as that would interfere with the accomplishment of the dominant
purpose of the act. It does not permit that inequality of rates
to arise indirectly through the application of estoppel which it
was the aim of the act to suppress directly."
And the Supreme Court of the United States has unequivo-
cally held that the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked against
the right to collect the legal rate. In Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Leather-wood it has said :1
"That a carrier cannot be prevented by estoppel or otherwise
from taking advantage of the lawful rate properly filed under
the Interstate Commerce Act is well settled. A carrier has, for
instance, been permitted to collect the legal rate, although it had
quoted a lower rate, and the shipper was ignorant of the fact that
it was not the legal rate."
And in the case of Pittsburg, Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fink
it is said :16
"Estoppel could not become the means of successfully avoid-
ing the 'requirements of the act as to equal rates in violation of the
provisions of the statute."
To the same effect is a recent Wisconsin case.1
7
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Pittsburg,
Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fink was confirmed by a more recent
decision handed down on May 16, 1921, by the same court, the
facts of which were that the carrier sued to collect alleged under-
charges on cars of melons consigned to defendant moving under
straight bills of lading, none of which came into the possession of
the consignee, defendant, and of whose issuance or terms defen-
dant knew nothing. Defendant accepted the cars and paid all the
charged claimed to be due, and later refused to pay the alleged
undercharges. The court said ::"
"We think that the doctrine announced in Pittsburg, Cincin-
nati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, is controll-
L5(1919) 250 U. S. 479, 481, 63 L. Ed. 1151, 40 S. C. R. 27.
16(1919) 250 U. S. 577, 583, 63 L. Ed. 1154, 40 S. C. R. 28.
"7Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. J. I. Case Plow Co., (1921) 173 Wis.
237, 180 N. W. 846.
18New York Central, etc., R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., (1921) 256
U. S. 406, 65 L. Ed. 1016, 41S. C. R. 509.
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ing and that the liability of York and Whitney was a question of
law. The transaction between the parties amounted to an as-
sumption by the consignee to pay the only lawful rate it had
a right to pay or the carrier a right to charge. The consignee
could not escape the liability imposed by law through any contract
with the carrier."
Since under the decisions~of the highest courts both the con-
signor and the consignee are equally liable for any unpaid freight
charges, it would seem that the carrier may proceed against either
or both to collect such charges, and if a suit against one of these
parties is not sufficient that another suit may be instituted against
the other party liable. Having rights against two parties, it
would seem that all the methods of procedure to enforce such
rights would follow as a natural consequence and that the en-
forcement of one right would not militate against the enforce-
ment of the other right against a different party nor operate as an
election limiting the carrier to its action against one party, although
there is a decision to the contrary.' An order-notify consignee
who has received the goods is treated in all respects as an ordinary
consignee, being liable for the freight charges."
The contract that the consignor and consignee may enter into
between themselves will not alter their individual and several
liability for all unpaid freight charges. For instance, if the con-
tract between the consignor and consignee called for shipment f.
o. b. destination and only a part or no part of the freight is paid
and the goods are delivered to the consignee, it is clear that in line
with the decisions above quoted the consignee would be liable for
the unpaid freight charges, either on the ground that the carrier
having given up its lien the consignee was impliedly bound to make
good any charges due, or on the ground that the lawful rate must
be paid and cannot be avoided by contracts of any description ;21
nor can the lawful rate be avoided by the use of sham devices.
For instance, undercharges may be collected on the basis of the
lawfully established interstate through rate on shipments that have
been first billed to an intermediate point and then rebilled to the
intended destination, this plan having been originated for the sole
purpose of getting the traffic through to the interstate destination
at the rates applicable to and from the intermediate point, the sum
19Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Zemurray, (1917) 238 Fed. 789.20Wabash Ry. Co. v. Bloomgarden, (1920) 212 Mich. 410, 180 N. W.
443.
21Note 15 and Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. New Albany Box & Basket Co.,
(1911) 48 Ind. App. 647, 94 N. E. 906.
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of which was materially less than the through rate for the through
service.
22
Prior to the Transportation Act 1920 the carriers could bring
suits for undercharges within the period allowed by the statutes
of limitation in the state in which the action was brought. In the
Transportation Act this subject is brought within the field of
federal control, it being provided that actions for undercharge
must be brought "within three years from the time the cause of
action accrues and not thereafter. '23 It is a general rule of law
that acts of limitation will be construed to operate prospectively
only unless the contrary intention clearly appears.2 4 The provision
above quoted dating the running of the statute "from the time the
cause of action accrues" does not show an intention of Congress
to make the limitation period in which the carriers must begin their
actions for charges retroactive. In line with the principles an-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court in an earlier case
it is thought that all claims which were not barred by the respec-
tive state statutes of limitation on February 28, 1920, may be sued
upon by the carriers for a period of three years after March 1,
1920.25 The laws of the forum would determine in each case
whether or not any particular claim was alive. These laws re-
main in full effect for that purpose, simply being superseded by the
federal statute as to the time within which actions may be
brought on live claims existing on and arising after March 1, 1920.
22Kanatex Refining Co. v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., (1915) 34 I. C. C. 271.23lnterstate Commerce Act, sec. 16, par. 3.
2425 Cyc. 994.
25Sobn v. Waterson, (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 596, 21 L. Ed. 731.
